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Translation as the Doctrine of Inter-
genre and Trans-genre 









For everything there is a season, and a time for every matter under 
heaven: 
a time to be born, and a time to die; 
a time to plant, and a time to pluck up what is planted; 
a time to kill, and a time to heal;  
a time to break down, and a time to build up; 
a time to weep, and a time to laugh; 
a time to mourn, and a time to dance; 
a time to cast away stones, and a time to gather stones together; 
a time to embrace, and a time to refrain from embracing; 
a time to seek, and a time to lose; 
a time to keep, and a time to cast away; 
a time to rend, and a time to sew;  
a time to keep silence, and a time to speak; 
a time to love, and a time to hate; 
a time for war, and time for peace. 
What gain has the worker from his toil?  





As the doctrine of inter-genre and trans-genre communication, 
‘translation semioethics’ is conceived as a field of semioethics (see 
Petrilli and Ponzio 2003, 2005). Semioethics is a specific approach in 
semiotics understood as global semiotics. That is, it is concerned with 
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‘care for life’ from a global semiotic and biosemiotic perspective which 
posits that semiosis and life coincide. Indeed, semioethics reflects the 
idea of semiotics recovering its ancient vocation as ‘semeiotics’ (or 
symptomatology) which is focussed on symptoms. 
 
As a general science or theory of signs, semiotics must tend 
towards global semiotics in terms of extension1. But in addition to 
indicating the general science of signs, the term ‘semiotics’ also has 
another meaning. ‘Semiotics’ is also used to indicate a special modality 
of using signs that is specific to human beings, a special human 
capacity. We are now referring to the capacity for metasemiosis which 
distinguishes human beings from other living beings. In fact, the latter 
are only capable of semiosis and not of metasemiosis or semiotics as 
we are now describing this term. From this point of view the human 
animal is a semiotic animal (see Deely, Petrilli, Ponzio, 2005).  
 
Metasemiosis refers to the capacity to reflect upon signs, 
therefore the capacity for critique and creativity. As such the capacity 
for metasemiosis is connected with the capacity for responsibility: the 
human animal is the only existent semiotic animal, that is, the only 
animal capable of accounting for signs and sign behaviour, of 
accounting for the other, whether the other of self or from self, and to 
the other. Therefore, the human being or semiotic animal is subject to 
and subject of responsibility. To the extent that the semiotician 
practices metasemiotics, s/he is at least twice responsible: the 
semiotician must account for him/herself as well as for others, and as a 
global semiotician s/he must account for life over the entire globe. 
Semiotics is a critical science in a Kantian sense, that is, in the sense 
that it investigates its own conditions of possibility, but not only. 
Semiotics is also a critical science in the sense that it interrogates the 
human world today on the assumption that it is not the only world 
possible, it is not the definitive world, as established by some 
conservative ideology. Critical semiotics looks at the world as a 
possible world, one among many possible worlds, therefore a world 
subject to confutation. 
 
As global semiotics, metasemiotics, critical semiotics, 
semiotics connected with responsibility, general semiotics must 
                                                 
1 From this perspective an exemplary text is Global Semiotics, of 2001, by 
Thomas A. Sebeok. This book was the point of arrival of all his research and 
the last he published before his death in that same year. 
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concern itself with life over the entire planet and not only in a cognitive 
sense, but also in the pragmatic, ethic, and therapeutic sense. The 
implication is that semiotics must care for life. From this perspective, 
semiotics must recover its relation to medical semeiotics. And this is 
not only a question of recovering historical memory, of recalling the 
origins, but far more radically it is a question of the ideologic-
programmatic order.  
 
From this perspective semiotics is listening. Semiotics must be 
intent upon listening. The allusion here is not to the general theory of 
signs, but rather to medical semeiotics, or symptomatology. Semiotics 
in a medical sense is listening as practiced by medical semeiotics or 
symptomatology. With reference to human culture and society, to 
anthroposemiosis and more specifically anthroposociosemiosis, 
semiotics must listen to the symptoms of today’s globalized world and 
identify the many expressions of unease and disease now proliferating 
in social relations, in international relations, in the life of single 
individuals, in the environment, in life generally over the entire planet. 
In a globalized world tending towards its own destruction, semiotics 
must diagnose symptoms, make a prognosis and indicate possible 
therapies to improve the future of globalization and the health of 
semiosis generally. This program, as stated, is part of an orientation in 
semiotics called semioethics proposed by the Bari-Lecce school (see 
Petrilli 2004b).  
 
Translation Theory and Semioethics as the Doctrine of Inter-genre 
and Trans-genre Communication 
 
‘Strictu sensu’ translation is the transposition of a text from one 
historical language to another. However, from a semiotic perspective 
such authors as Victoria Welby (1837-1912), Charles S. Peirce (1839-
1914), and Roman Jakobson (1896-1982) recognized the importance of 
translation in semiosic and semiotic processes at large. Understood as a 
process where one sign is considered as equivalent to another which it 
replaces and somehow develops, translation presupposes: 1) the 
activity of translating, that is, a series of operations whereby one 
semiotic entity is replaced by another; and 2) the condition of 
translatability, that is, inter-replaceability, interchangeability among 
semiotic entities. It must be evidenced that 1) and 2) are prerogatives of 
semiosis and of the sign. Therefore translation is a phenomenon that 
pertains to sign reality and as such is the object of study of semiotics.  
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 Translation semioethics is concerned with translation in the 
triple sense identified by Jakobson: intralingual, interlingual, and 
intersemiosic translation. As a field of semiotics oriented in the 
direction of semioethics, translation semioethics focuses on translation 
in this triple sense.  
 
The term ‘doctrine’ is used in this paper as understood by 
Thomas A. Sebeok (1921-2001) in his Contributions to the Doctrine of 
Signs (1976). Despite its characteristic totalizing orientation, semiotics 
in this book is neither designated with the ennobling term ‘science,’ nor 
‘theory.’ Instead, Sebeok chose the expression ‘doctrine of signs’ 
which he adapted from John Locke who maintained that a doctrine was 
nothing more than a body of principles and opinions vaguely forming a 
field of knowledge. At the same time, however, Sebeok also used this 
expression à la Peirce, that is, charging it with instances of Kantian 
critique. In other words, from Sebeok’s perspective, not only must 
semiotics observe and describe phenomena, that is, signs (in reality 
semiosis, that is, sign activity, sign processes), but it must also 
interrogate the conditions of possibility of signs, characterizing and 
specifying them for what they are (as revealed by observation, which is 
necessarily partial and limited), and for what they must be (see 
Sebeok’s Preface to his book of 1976 cited above). This humble and 
together ambitious character of the ‘doctrine of signs’ leads it to 
interrogate its own conditions of possibility, as Kant taught: the 
doctrine of signs is the science of signs which questions itself and 
attempts to answer for itself, which researches into its very own 
foundations. 
 
The term ‘genre’ is an abstraction that determines another 
abstraction: the ‘individual.’ Genre and individual are concrete 
abstractions: abstractions that form the reality we live in. Specifically, 
politics and logic share the commonality that they consider singularities 
as individuals, therefore as belonging to a genre, as equals. The relation 
of alterity between one singularity and another is pre-political and pre-
logical. Politics and logic arise because of my exclusive responsibility 
towards every other, such that I am obliged to keep faith to this 
responsibility and relate to every other indifferently. This means that I 
must not only relate to a singularity, but to a singularity according to a 
genre. I am obliged to relate to the individual of a given system or 
group, who as such is interchangeable with other individuals, so that 
whether I am dealing with one individual or another is indifferent. This 
involves a continuous translation process from singularities to 
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individuals and genres, from alterities to identities, from difference of 
signs to signs of difference that identify a genre. Individual identity and 
community identity are fixed by and in genres.  
 
An example is the concept of nation which may be considered 
from a semiotic perspective with a focus on the signs of difference and 
identity. The concept of nation is one of the concrete abstractions 
through which community identity is asserted. This concrete 
abstraction, as all other concrete abstractions, is at once material and 
fictitious. And given that they are made of signs, of semiotic matter, all 
social-political constructs, including the economic and political system 
called World are concrete abstractions. The concept of world is a 
construction, a projection, a geographical and ideological projection, in 
other words, a product of social planningand national identity is part 
of such planning. Being a category of identity, the nation is also a 
category of difference. Such duality is reflected in the term ‘nation’ 
itself, which is ambivalent. In fact, the term ‘nation’ is endowed with 1) 
an essentially political meaning, which found expression during the 
Age of Enlightenment and the French Revolution. According to this 
meaning the Nation is a State that gives expression to the sovereignty of 
the people. The term ‘nation’ is also endowed with 2) an ethno-
linguistic meaning which matured during the Romantic Age. According 
to this meaning one Nation differs from another on the basis of ethnic 
group and language. These two meanings of nation evidence two 
different ways of conceiving the origin itself of national identity. In the 
first case, the origin of identity is political, juridical and economic, 
therefore, national identity is recognized for what it is, that is to say, a 
socio-historical construct. In the second case, the origin of identity is 
considered to be natural. This second guise also involves socio-
historical factors such as language and cultural traditions, which are 
associated with ‘natural’ factors such as blood and territory. In this 
case, and similarly to the latter, socio-historical factors are conceived to 
be natural (the common expression ‘natural languages’ is 
symptomatic), and in any case they are considered as factors that 
naturally determine national differences. 
 
The categories of ‘identity’ and ‘genre’ are intimately 
interrelated and play a central role in today’s communication society, 
whether we are dealing with the identity of the individual subject or the 
collective onesocial class, ethnic group, nation, European Union, 
‘Western world,’ etc. Individuals belong to genres, sexual genres 
(genders), classes, professional genres, racial, ethnic or national genres, 
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etc. Relations among singularities are translated into relations among 
individuals, which are relations among genres. Translation semioethics 
as the doctrine of inter-genre and trans-genre communication aims to 
invert this process, proposing the opposite translation trajectory: 
translation into the signs of the relation among singularities, what 
Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) calls ‘le face-à-face’, relation 
irréductible, an irreducible relationship.  
 
 The human individual may be described as a semiosic process; 
indeed, thanks to its interpretive-propositional commitment, the 
individual consists of a potentially infinite number of signifying 
trajectories. As a developing sign, the individual is a dialogic and 
relational entity, an open individual emerging in the relation with other 
individuals. Therefore, the boundaries and the signs of the individual 
are not defined once and for all, but can only be defined through 
dialogical encounters with other individuals, that is, with other genres.  
 
The self is a community of dialogically interrelated selves, and 
is subject to the logic of alterity. The subject’s identity is multiplex, 
plurifaceted and plurivocal, it is delineated and modeled in the dialogic 
relation among its various parts. If we interpret the word ‘in-dividual’ 
literally as meaning ‘non divided, non divisible,’ with Peirce who 
rejected the ‘illusory phenomenon’ of a finite self or self-sufficient self, 
we may claim that ‘a person is not absolutely an individual’ (CP 
5.421). The social and communal character of self does not contrast 
with its singularity, uniqueness or otherness with respect to any 
signifying process that may interpret it. The self is ineffable (see CP 
1.357), saying beyond the said; self’s utterances convey significance 
beyond words. On the other hand, ineffability and uniqueness of self do 
not imply incommunicability. 
 
Victoria Welby analyses the problem of subjectivity in terms 
of the relationship between what she calls ‘I,’ or, introducing a 
neologism, Ident, and ‘self,’ or, with another neologism, ephemeron2. 
Self is mortal, ephemeral like the body. By contrast, I tends towards 
immortality beyond the mortality of body and self. Thus articulated, the 
                                                 
2 Victoria Welby’s unpublished manuscripts are available in the Welby 
Collection, York University Archives and Special Collections, Toronto. A file 
entitled Subjectivity includes texts written between 1903 and 1910, see in 
particular the manuscripts of 1907-1910. For a description of the Welby 
Collection, see Schmitz 1990 and Petrilli 1998a. 
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subject is not unitary or compact, but presents a surplus, something 
more with respect to identity itself, which is constructed in the dialogic 
relationship between self and I. I or Ident is not the ‘individual,’ but the 
‘unique’. Says Welby in her unpublished manuscripts: “It is precisely 
our di-viduality that forms the wealth of our gifts” (‘I and Self,’ Box 
27, file 13, Welby Collection, York University Archives and Special 
Collections, Scott Library, North York, Toronto, Canada). 
 
That the subject is an incarnate subject, intercorporeal being, a 
body interconnected with other bodies, expression of the condition of 
intercorporeity in both synchronic and diachronic terms; that the 
subject is incarnated in a body that is related and not isolated from 
other bodies is essential to our conception of subjectivity. The subject 
is an incarnate entity from the perspective of biological evolution, of 
the species, as well as in terms of sociality and cultural history. The 
body plays a fundamental role in the development of consciousness, 
which is incarnate consciousness. Indeed the body is a condition for 
full development of consciousness, for the development of the human 
being as a ‘semiotic animal’ (see Petrilli, 1998b; Petrilli and Ponzio, 
2003; Deely, Petrilli, Ponzio, 2005). Self develops interconnectedly 
with other bodies through which it extends its boundaries, which are 
the boundaries of the world it experiences. The word is an extension of 
the body. Echoing the Russian philosopher Mikhail M. Bakhtin (1895-
1975), the word forms a bridge joining one’s own body to the body of 
others (see Bakhtin, 1990).  
 
The dialogic relation between self and other (other from self 
and other of self) emerges as one of the most important conditions for 
continuity in the creative process. A driving force in this creative 
process is love, the forces of agape. In the architecture of Peirce’s 
thought system, the most advanced developments in reason and 
knowledge are based on the creative power of reasonableness and the 
transformative suasions of agape. 
 
Translation semioethics of genres and individuals belonging to 
genres must not only keep account of but also account for the ‘reason 
of things.’ However, the reason of things, the philosophical certainty of 
being right, avoir raison, to echo Levinas, cannot be separated from the 
capacity for reasonableness which is grounded in the logic of 
otherness. This means to say that the reason of things cannot be 
separated from the capacity for detotalization as the condition for 
constituting critical and dialogic globality. The issue at stake may be 
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stated in the following terms: given the risks inherent for life in today’s 
global communication society which is regulated by the logic of 
identity and excludes the other, human beings at their very earliest 
must change from rational animals into reasonable animals. 
 
Reasonableness is endowed with the power of transforming 
horror of the stranger, the alien, fear of the other understood as fear of 
the other foreign to self, into sympathy for the other become lovely. To 
read Peirce in the light of Levinas’s philosophy of subjectivity: under 
the hardened crust of identity, through love the subject rediscovers his 
or her fear for the other and not of the other, fear for the other’s well-
being, which renders self incessantly restless and preoccupied for the 
other. Love, reasonableness, creativity are all grounded in the logic of 
otherness and dialogism, and together move the evolutionary dynamics 
of human semiosis globally. 
 
From Genres and Individuals to the Face-to-Face Relationship 
 
Says Levinas in “Judaïsme et temps présent” (1960): 
 
A religious age or an atomic agethese characterizations of the 
modern world, whether slogans or imprecations, hide a deeper trend. 
In spite of the violence and madness we see everyday, we live in the 
age of philosophy. Men are sustained in their activities by the 
certainty of being right (avoir raison), of being in tune with the 
calculable forces that really move things along, of moving in the 
direction (sens) of history. That satisfies their conscience. Beyond the 
progress of science, which uncovers the predictable play of forces 
within matter, human freedoms themselves (including those thoughts 
which conceive of such a play) are regulated by a rational order. 
Hidden in the depths of Being, this order is gradually unveiled and 
revealed through the disorder of contemporary history, through the 
suffering and desire of individuals, their passions and their victories. 
A global industrial society is announced that will suppress every 
contradiction tormenting humanity. But it equally suppresses the 
hidden heart of man. Reason rises like a fantastic sun that makes the 
opacity of creatures transparent. Men have lost their shadows! 
Henceforth, nothing can absorb or reflect this light which abolishes 
even the interiority of beings. (Levinas, 1960, Eng. trans., p. 253)  
 
The properly human, the ‘metaphysical’ in Levinas’s 
terminology, ‘transcendence’ of the human is determined by the 
capacity for absolute otherness (not only beyond the totality but also at 
its foundations, as it’s a priori), for unlimited responsibility, for the 
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relation of dialogic intercorporeity among unindifferent differences, for 
nonfunctionality with respect to the functionality of identity and 
relative roles. Levinas speaks of the ‘désir de l’Autre’ (see 1961, Eng. 
trans., pp. 33-35). The properly human is the condition of vulnerability 
and exposition to the other. 
 
The places that best evidence the properly human are those 
where time is beaten out in terms of the relation to the absolute and 
nonfunctional other; the time of aging, disease, and death, the time of 
friendship and eroticism, the time of mothering and nurturing, the time 
of aesthetic discourseliterature, figurative arts, music, cinema, the 
time of inventiveness and scientific research, the time of the play of 
musement, the time of the ephemeral. This is the time of excess with 
respect to closed identity, the time of dialogic detotalization and 
proliferation of differences that cannot be recruited and put at the 
service of the World.  
 
By ‘World’ is understood the world governed by the logic of 
identity, by realism in its most vulgar forms characterizing dominant 
Western world ideology, identity, being, the order of discourse, the 
functional subject with a good conscience, the lying rhetoric of political 
systems and of mass media. All these places respond to today’s global 
and totalizing world, where transparency is the motto, where even the 
interiority of beings is abolished: a world without a shadow. The global 
market and the global communication network together exert power 
and control over bodies which are proposed as self-sufficient and 
separate individual entities, and which, of course, they are not. The 
tendency in globalization today is to homogenize and level differences 
onto dominant values as determined by the global market and global 
communication. All the same signs of resistance also emerge in the 
face of the processes of monological homogenization as special 
semioses, languages and cultures continue to flourish. 
 
Constitutively the World as we are describing it is based on 
identity. It is predisposed or programmed for sacrifice of the other, of 
otherness, in the name of identity. From this perspective, similarly to 
rest, free-time, the night functional to the resumption of work, to the 
violence and ‘madness of the day’ (see Blanchot, 1969, 1973), peace is 
no more than an interval, momentary repose, reintegration of forces, 
respite, a truce which ensues from war, preparation for war. 
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The questions to ask are the same as those formulated by 
Levinas throughout the entire course of his research. Is there any other 
sense than being in the World and for the World? Can the properly 
human supersede the space-time of objects, the space-time of identity? 
Do there exist relations that cannot be reduced to the category of 
identity, that are alien to relations between subject and object, to 
relations of exchange, equivalence, functionality, interest, productivity? 
Can there be interhuman relations that are altogether other, yet at once 
material and earthly, relations to which one’s body may open? Can 
there be a sense that is other from sense in the world of objects? (see 
Levinas, ‘Notes sur le sens’, in Levinas, 1986, Eng. trans., pp. 152-
171). All this moves in the direction of the proposal of a new form of 
humanism, that is to say, humanism not as it is traditionally conceived 
in the Western World, the humanism of identity, but rather what may 
be called the humanism of alterity (see Levinas, 1972).  
 
The humanism of alterity, as this expression itself tells us, is 
oriented by the logic of otherness: it tells of a ‘movement’ without 
return to the subject, a movement called œuvre, risky exposition to 
alterity, hybridization of identity, rupture of monologism and evasion 
from the subject-object relation (see Levinas, 1935-1936, pp. 373-392). 
Hors-sujet (Outside the subject) is the title of a book of 1987 by 
Levinas; ‘hors-sujet’ also in the sense of being off the subject, not 
responsive to thematization, representation, to the logic of identity. The 
logic of otherness is the condition of possibility for a form of 
humanism where a good or clear conscience, human rights, meaning 
the rights of self, of identity, are interrogated in the light of the rights of 
others.  
 
In ‘le face-à-face’ relation with the other, the I is interrogated. 
Through its nudity, exposition, fragility, the face says that otherness 
will never be eliminated. The otherness of others resists to the very 
point of calling for recourse to homicide and war, providing evidence 
and proof of the other’s irreducibility. Another one, autrui, this other, 
says Levinas, puts the I into the accusative, summoning it, questioning 
it, calling it back to the condition of absolute responsibility, outside the 
sphere of the I’s initiative. Absolute responsibility is responsibility for 
the other, responsibility understood as answering to the other and for 
the other (see Levinas ‘La substitution’ (Substitution), in Levinas, 
1974, Eng. trans., pp. 99-130). 
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The relation to the other is asymmetrical, unequal: the other is 
out of proportion with respect to the I’s power and freedom. Moral 
consciousness interrogates self’s freedom. However, interrogation is at 
once constitutive of self and its freedom insofar as it sanctions the 
passage from spontaneity to consciousness, from freedom as passive 
enjoyment (jouissance) and self’s happy spontaneity, to freedom as a 
right, and speaking that right (see Levinas, ‘Section II, B. Jouissance et 
representation’ (Enjoyment and Representation), in Levinas, 1961, 
Eng. trans., pp. 122-143). 
 
The rights and freedom of self are instituted in the face of the 
need to answer to others, under the weight of unlimited responsibility 
for others. The origin of self, an origin without an arché, in this sense 
anarchical, arises from an uneasy conscience in the face of others, from 
a dirty conscience, therefore, from the need to justify one’s presence to 
others, from responsibility without alibis and without evasion from 
others (see Levinas, ‘Humanisme et an-archie’ (Humanism and an-
archy), in Levinas, 1972, Eng. trans., pp. 127-139). In the continued 
effort to achieve a good conscience, self in the nominative, self 
understood as subject, as intentional consciousness, as speech, derives 
from interrogating self and putting it into the accusative. From such 
interrogation also derive self’s freedoms, self’s rightsso-called 
‘human rights,’ elaborated to defend self summoned by the face of the 
other to account for the rights of others and to defend itself as ‘I,’ as 
self.  
 
Opposition of a nude face, opposition of disarmed eyes, 
deprived of protection, beginning from which self is constituted as 
responsibility, is not opposition by a force, by a relation of hostility. 
Rather, this is peace-loving opposition, where peace is not merely 
understood as suspension of violence, violence withheld only to be 
used more effectively. On the contrary, the violence perpetuated is the 
violence of eliminating peace-loving opposition, outwitting it, the 
violence of ignoring the face, avoiding the gaze. ‘No’ is written on the 
face of the otherin the first place, ‘Thou shalt not kill’because of the 
simple fact of being a face. However, the other having been absolved 
from the relation with an I has sense in itself, on its own account. As 
such the other may absent itself from the presence of self and its 
projects, not go along with it. Violence is perpetuated when no 
inscribed on the face of the other is converted into a relation of hostile 
force or of submission. Violence consists in prevailing over the other, 
to the very point of murder and war. Prevarication is perpetuated in 
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spite of opposition to violence expressed in the commandment ‘Thou 
shalt not kill’ which is inscribed on the face even before it is explicated 
in a formula, which precedes rational thought, being as ‘I,’ statements 
made by the subject, knowledge and objectifying consciousness (see 
Levinas, ‘Entretiens,’ in Poirié, 1987, p. 104). Humanism implies 
responsibility for the other, an interpersonal relationship where the 
subject “reaches the human condition assuming responsibility for the 
other person in the election that elevates it to this degree” (Levinas, 
1990). 
 
The work of interpersonal responsibility is the work of the 
individual in its singularity, of the person who is absolutely 
responsible: responsible like a hostage who must account for something 
he did not do, for a past which was never his, which was never present 
to him (see Levinas, ‘Entretiens,’ in Poirié, 1987, p. 118). 
 
Responsibility for others is oriented in a dual sense: the other 
is elevated and taken upon one’s own shoulders, so to say, in a 
relationship that is asymmetrical. The person I must answer for is also 
the person I must answer to, says Levinas. I must answer to the person 
whom I must answer for. Responsibility in the face of the person I am 
responsible for: responsible for a face that regards me, for its freedom 
(see Levinas, ‘Liberté et commandement,’ 1953 (Freedom and 
Command), in Levinas, 1987b, pp. 15-24). 
 
The condition of peace and responsibility in the face of the 
other, in a relation where individuals give themselves in their 
singularity, difference, non-interchangeability, non-indifference, 
precedes politics and logic, says Levinas. We have observed that 
politics and logic consider individuals as part of a genre, therefore as 
equals. Instead, the relation of alterity is pre-political and pre-logical. 
Politics and logic arise because of my responsibility towards the other 
in its singularity, and also because I am obliged to relate to the other 
indifferently, that is to say, on the basis of a genre.  
 
Therefore, political and community organization with its logic, 
laws, distinctions, classifications, finds its justification in responsibility 
for the other. However, history also shows that justification, 
responsibility for the other, therefore the sense of politics, the order of 
logic may be lost. This is particularly manifest today in spite of the 
situation of so-called global communication.  
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A paradox connected with globalization in the present-day 
phase of development consists in the fact that social relationships 
emerge in terms of relations among individuals who are separate from 
each other, reciprocally indifferent to each other. The relation to the 
other is suffered as a necessity for the sake of achieving one’s own 
private interests. Furthermore, exclusive preoccupation with one’s own 
identity, one’s own difference indifferent to the difference of others 
increases fear of the other understood in the transitive as fearing the 
other. Following such logic, the community is a passive result of the 
interests of identities, indifferent to each other. Indeed, thus construed 
the community only presents itself as compact identity for as long as its 
interests require cohesion and unification.  
 
The egological community, the community of selves forming 
the identity of each and every one of us presents the same type of 
sociality. We are referring to sociality founded upon relations of 
reciprocal indifference among differences and identities. Such a 
condition ensues from and is at once evidenced by separation between 
public and private behaviour in the same individual subject, separation 
and mutual indifference among roles, competencies, tasks, languages, 
among responsibilities in the same individual, in the same subject, 
separation viewed as the ‘normal’ or ‘standard’ way of conforming to 
the social system that subject belongs to. 
 
Fear of the other, to fear the other, ensues from the 
constitution of identity. In today’s world, fear of the other understood 
as fearing the other, fear that the subject experiences of the object, has 
reached paroxysmal degrees. However, contrary to the Hobbesian 
principle as formulated in the expression ‘homo homini lupus,’ fear in 
the transitive is not at all the starting point, but rather the point of 
arrival in the constitution of identity (see Levinas, ‘Entretiens,’ in 
Poirié, 1987, pp. 117-120). 
 
‘Fear of the other’ means fear that the subject experiences ‘of 
the other’ understood as object genitive: the other constitutes the object 
of fear. Logic distinguishes the object genitive from the subject 
genitivethe other subject of fear, in the sense of the other who fears. 
Subject and object. However, we must abandon this dichotomy as 
traditionally established in logic if we are to grasp a third sense, which 
is fear for the other. According to this third sense, fear of the other 
means to experience the other’s fear, fear as experienced by the other, 
therefore fear for the other. In this case, we neither distinguish between 
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subject and object, nor refer to community identity. In other words, the 
relationship among differences no longer implies community 
identification, indifference among identities and differences. On the 
contrary, the relation among differences is based on unindifference 
among differences, on absolute otherness, transcendence with respect 
to identity. Following this logic and developing Levinas, the expression 
‘of the other’ may be designated as an ethical genitive (see Ponzio, 
1995, 1996). This third case of the genitive should be taken into 
account by logic as the third sense in which we may disambiguate the 
expression ‘fear of the other,’ that is, as ‘fear for the other.’ 
 
Humanism, Intercorporeity, and Detotalization of Abstractions 
Connected with Genre 
 
Levinas continues the passage cited above from ‘Judaïsme et temps 
présent’ as follows: 
 
What matters is to be authentic and not at all to be true (dans le vrai), 
to commit oneself rather than to know. Art, love, action are more 
important than theory. Talent is worth more than wisdom and self-
possession. (Levinas, 1960, Eng. trans., p. 254). 
 
With the spread of ‘biopower’ and the controlled insertion of 
bodies into the production apparatus, global communication asserts the 
idea of the individual as a separate and self-sufficient entity (see 
Foucault, 1977, 1988; Foucault et alii, 1996). The body is experienced 
as an isolated biological entity, belonging to the individual, as part of 
the individual’s sphere of possession. This has led to the almost total 
extinction of cultural practices and worldviews based on 
intercorporeity, interdependency, exposition and opening of the body. 
We are left with mummified residues studied by folklore analysts, 
archeological remains preserved in ethnological museums and in the 
history of national literaturesthe expression of a generalized situation 
of museumification. 
 
Think of the different ways the body is perceived by popular 
culture as discussed by Bakhtin, of the various forms of ‘grotesque 
realism’ which do not conceive the body and corporeal life generally in 
individualistic terms, separately from the rest of terrestrial life, indeed, 
from the rest of the world (see Bakhtin, 1963, 1965). Signs of the 
grotesque body (only weak traces of which have survived in the present 
age) include ritual masks present in Middle Age popular festivities and 
in all pre-capitalist cultural systems over the planet (e.g. among the 
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Amerindians studied by Lévi-Strauss, see his book of 19753). 
Antecedently to the development of individualism connected with the 
rise of the bourgeoisie, ‘grotesque realism’ in medieval popular culture 
presented the body as undefined, not confined to itself, but, on the 
contrary, as flourishing in relations of symbiosis with other bodies, in 
relations of transformation and renewal transcending the limits of 
individual life. Today, global communication (which is global 
communication-production, see Petrilli and Ponzio, 2005 and Petrilli 
ed., 2006), reinforces the individualistic, private and static conception 
of body, being a conception that is functional to the ‘technologies of 
self.’ 
  
As Michel Foucault in particular has revealed, division and 
separatism among the sciences are functional to the socio-ideological 
necessities of the ‘new cannon of the individualized body’ (Bakhtin).4 
This, in turn, is functional to the controlled insertion of bodies into the 
social reproductive cycles of today’s communication-production 
system. 
  
An approach to the study of signs that is global and 
detotalizing must be founded on the logic of otherness at high degrees 
of availability for the other, readiness to listen to the other, opening to 
the other, not only in quantitative terms (the omnicomprehensive 
character of global semiotics), but also qualitatively (Petrilli, 1990). All 
semiotic interpretations by the student of signs, especially at a meta-
semiotic level, must not prescind from a dialogic relationship with the 
other. Dialogism is a fundamental condition for an approach that is 
globally oriented while privileging at once opening to the local, the 
particular that is not isolated or closed in upon itself. Accordingly, such 
an approach privileges the tendency towards detotalization by contrast 
with totalization.  
  
Otherness obliges the totality to reorganize itself ever anew in 
a process related to ‘infinity,’ as Levinas in particular has demonstrated 
(see Levinas, 1961, 1982a), or to ‘infinite semiosis,’ in Peirce’s 
terminology. The relation to infinity is far more than a cognitive issue: 
                                                 
3 For an evaluation by Lévi-Strauss of Sebeok’s work, see Lévi-Strauss, 
‘Avant-Propos,’ in Bouissac, Herzfeld, Posner, 1986, p. 3. 
 
4 Here we must also signal important writings from the 1970s by Italian 
philosopher Ferruccio Rossi-Landi (1921-1985), see References. 
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beyond the established order, the symbolic order, convention and habit, 
the relation to infinity implies a relation of involvement and 
responsibility. The relation to infinity is the relation to absolute 
otherness, to that which is most refractory to the totality, to the Same. 
The relation to infinity implies a relation to the otherness of others, to 
the otherness of the other person, not understood as another self like 
one’s own self, another alter ego, another I belonging to the same 
community, but as the other that is alien, the other in its extraneousness, 
strangeness, diversity, difference towards which we must not be 
indifferent in spite of efforts and guarantees to the contrary offered by 
identity of I, by self.  
  
The global and detotalizing approach to the life of signs we 
are proposing is not intended to orient semiotics according to some 
specific ideological plan. Rather, our focus is on human behaviour and 
the unique responsibility with which the human being is invested as a 
‘semiotic animal.’ As anticipated above, the expression ‘semiotic 
animal’ indicates a responsible agent capable of signs of signs, of 
suspending action and deliberating, of creative mediation, reflection 
and critique. 
  
Global semiotics must be adequately founded in cognitive 
semiotics, but it must also open to a third dimension beyond the 
quantitative and the theoretical, the ethical, or, better, what we propose 
to call ‘semioethic.’ Semioethics is related to our proposal of a new 
form of humanism (see Petrilli and Ponzio, 2003). In fact, recalling 
Levinas, but also the other authors mentioned in this paper, semioethics 
summons us to authenticity of commitment at a pragmatic level, the 
level of action, beyond the purely theoretical; semioethics summons us 
to participation and involvement with the other beyond individual 
separatisms and interests, to care and love for the other (see also, 
Levinas, ‘Philosophie, Justice et amour’ (Philosophy, Justice, and 
Love), in Levinas, 1991, Eng trans., pp. 103-121). Art, talent is more 
important than wisdom and self-possession, says Levinas; beyond 
reason reasonableness, says Peirce. Semioethics aims to transcend 
separatism among the sciences and among the objects of their research, 
and to relate the natural sciences to the logico-mathematical and the 
human sciences. 
  
Semioethics does not propose a program with intended aims 
and practices, a decalogue, a formula to apply more or less sincerely or 
more or less hypocritically. Rather semioethics implies a propensity for 
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critique with a special vocation for evidencing sign networks where it 
seemed there were none. In other words, semioethics aims to reveal and 
evaluate interconnections and implications that cannot be evaded where 
it seemed there were only separations, boundaries and distances with 
their relative alibis. 
  
The new form of humanism we are proposing can only be the 
humanism of alterity, as demonstrated by Levinas throughout all his 
writings, and most explicitly in Humanisme de l’autre homme (see also 
‘Les droits de l’homme et les droits d’autrui’ (The Rights of Man and 
the Rights of the Other), in Levinas 1987b, pp. 116-125). We have 
hinted at the fact that present-day dominant ideology has centred its 
claim to human rights on the rights of identity, eliminating from the 
very concept of ‘human rights’ the rights of the other. If we are to 
safeguard life globally over the planet, this orientation must be quickly 
counteracted by the humanism of alterity where the rights of the other 
are the first to be safeguarded. Our allusion is not just to the other 
beyond self, but also to the self’s very own other, to the other of self. In 
fact, the self characteristically tends to remove, suffocate and segregate 
otherness mostly sacrificing it to the cause of identity. However, 
identity thus achieved is fictitious so that all efforts made to maintain or 
recover identity in such terms are vain. 
  
Semiotics contributes to the humanism of alterity by 
evidencing the extension and consistency of the sign network 
connecting one human being to every other, synchronically and 
diachronically. The progressive spread of communication at a planetary 
level makes it susceptible to synchronic analysis. But communication is 
also subject to diachronic investigations that are staggering for 
diversity to say the least. In fact, the overall destiny of the human 
species is implied in any action or decision made by the individual, just 
as the destiny of the individual is implied in that of the human species, 
from its most remote to its most recent and closest manifestations, from 
its past to its evolutionary future, in biological terms as well as the 
socio-historical. This sign network concerns the semiosphere 
constructed by mankind, a sphere inclusive of culture, its signs, 
symbols, artifacts, etc. But global semiotics teaches us that this 
semiosphere is part of a far broader semiosphere, the semiobiosphere 
forming the habitat of humanity (the matrix whence we sprang and the 




Semiotics has the merit of demonstrating that whatever is 
human involves signs. Indeed, more than this: whatever is simply alive 
involves signs. And this is as far as cognitive semiotics and global 
semiotics reach. Semioethics pushes this awareness further in the 
direction of ethics and beyond; from a semioethic perspective the 
question of responsibility cannot be evaded at the most radical level 
(that of defining commitments and values). Our ethos, even more, the 
cosmos itself falls within the scope of human responsibility. The 
implication is that for an adequate interpretation of human sign 
behaviour, we must consider the hypothesis that if all the human 
involves signs, then all signs in turn are human. However, this 
humanistic commitment does not mean to reassert monologic identity 
yet again, nor any other form of anthropocentrism. On the contrary, a 
radical operation of decentralization is implied, indeed nothing less 
than a Copernican revolution. As Welby would say, ‘geocentrism’ must 
be superseded, then ‘heliocentrism,’ until we approximate a truly 
cosmic perspective (see Welby. 1983). To reach such a perspective is 
an integral part of our ultimate end, a point where global semiotics and 
‘semioethics’ intersect. As to the question of human responsibility and, 
therefore, of humanism as we have described it so far, what is at stake 
more than anything else is the logic of otherness. But it is time to add 
that in the light of global semiotics otherness may now be understood 
differently from previous interpretations: not only as the other of self, 
or the other from self, our neighbour (whether close or distant, in truth 
always close), but the other also referred to living beings distant in 
genetic terms. 
 
Signs of Difference and Difference of Signs 
 
‘Signs make difference.’ ‘Difference makes signs’: two statements on 
the relation between ‘signs’ and ‘difference.’ However, contrary to 
initial impressions, this relation is neither symmetrical nor reciprocal. 
In the first statement, the term ‘difference’ merely indicates a state, 
while in the second case it also indicates a process. Therefore, the two 
statements ‘signs make difference’ and ‘difference makes signs’ are not 
at all symmetrical, nor do they reciprocally imply each other, given that 
in the first case, as stated, ‘difference’ indicates a state and in the 
second a process (see Ponzio, 2003 pp. 195-198). This condition is also 
evidenced by the fact that, in the first case ‘difference’ may be replaced 
by ‘identity,’ while in the second case it cannot. 
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‘Signs make difference’ may be considered as synonymous to 
‘signs make identity.’ In fact, difference understood with reference to 
state means to interpret difference as ‘identity.’ On the contrary, 
‘difference makes signs’ cannot be interpreted as ‘identity makes 
signs.’ Not only would Peirce have rejected such a statement, but so 
would have Ferdinand de Saussure. Nor could it find a place in any 
other semiotic conception worthy of that name. In Peirce’s description 
the sign stat pro aliquo and is understood in terms of interpretation. 
This approach evidences the fact that the sign is made of difference.  
 
Here ‘difference’ may be interpreted at least in two different 
ways: 1) ‘Difference’ in the sense of differing from other signs: for 
example, on the semantic level a word differs from its synonyms in a 
given state of language. Think of Saussure’s famous examples from the 
English language, the difference between mutton and sheep; or with 
reference to French synonyms, the difference between redouter, 
craindre, avoir peur. On a phonological level, think of the binary 
relation between opposed distinctive features such as d and t, b and p; 
2) ‘Difference’ in the sense of deferral: the sign is also made of 
difference in the sense that it defers to something else. The sign refers 
to or defers to another sign which acts as its interpretant. In this case, 
therefore, the sign is not merely a static fact of pre-established 
relationships, but a process of deferral, indeed, an infinite process of 
deferrals, as says Peirce, from one interpretant to another. 
 
Before Jacques Derrida replaces the ‘e’ with an ‘a’ in the 
French word différance to indicate the process of deferral, Peirce had 
already conveyed the dynamic sense of difference, that is, of deferral 
among signs with his idea of infinite semiosis. Deferral among sign and 
interpretant is understood in the dialogic terms of question and answer: 
the interpretant responds to the sign, is an answer to it, an answer to the 
sign that presents itself as a question. This sets clear limits to 
interpretation in the perspective of a dialogic relation that is open and at 
once tied to or restrained by the irreducible otherness of its terms. 
 
The sign resists identity, is refractory to difference understood 
as a state, and flourishes instead in deferral, in infinite deferral. Yet, 
according to the first statement, ‘signs make difference,’ understood as 
‘signs make identity,’ signs most ironically make difference in terms of 
state, of identity. 
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 However, it is important to repeat that signs on the contrary 
are vowed to difference understood in terms of shift, deferral, dialogic 
opening, otherness. The difference that makes signs is otherness; 
difference thus understood opens the sign to infinite semiosis and 
distinguishes it from the signal, that is, from the univocality, 
monologism, and static nature of the signal.  
 
Signs that make difference are signs reduced to the status of 
signal, signs that have lost their capacity for deferral. Therefore we 
could speak of a reductive use of signs which are put at the service of 
difference understood as identity closed in upon itself, which are used 
to make and to mark difference and identity thus understood. 
 
Our aim is to critique conceptions that employ signs to make 
differences, to mark differences internally to the world of signs. 
Reference here is to the world of human signs, to cultures, to the sphere 
of anthroposemiosis. When we ask where signs make the difference 
referring to the world of signs, the entire semio-biosphere (Sebeok), the 
answer is that this phenomenon only occurs in human cultures, in 
anthroposemiosis. Only in the sphere of anthroposemiosis are signs 
used to make difference in terms of individual, social, and national 
identities. This is possible thanks to a specifically human capacity 
called metasemiosis, which makes the human being a unique type of 
animal, that is to say, a semiotic animal. However, as anticipated, such 
use of signs is limiting, given that it reduces signs to the status of 
signals. Signs used to make difference, to fix identities in the sphere of 
anthroposemiosis, means to use signs abusively, aberrantly with respect 
to semiosis in general. In fact, use of signs to make difference 
interrupts the processes of deferral and relates the sign to static 
difference, difference understood as fixed identity, and not difference 
understood as an open process, dialogic movement, participation, 
involvement, intercorporeity, otherness. 
 
Difference as identity refers to indifferent difference, the type 
of difference that is connected with functions and roles as required by 
the ‘closed universe of discourse’ (Marcuse), which foresees 
alternatives, but excludes difference understood in terms of otherness. 
  
Difference as otherness is unindifferent difference (see 
Levinas, 1961 and 1974), difference understood as dialogic 
involvement and participation with other differences. Difference 
understood in terms of otherness is not difference in the sense of being 
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otherwise, which is characteristic of alternatives, but rather in the sense 
of otherwise than being (Levinas, 1974): difference as otherness is 
difference understood as deferral beyond identity of being, whether 
individual or collective. 
 
Signs may be used by cultures in at least two different ways: 
to establish differences with respect to other cultures, to establish 
identities, that is, to define a culture’s identity and juxtapose it to 
others; or as a means of responding to signs, whether their own or of 
others, in dialogic interrelations, in processes of infinite deferral, in 
which one sign refers to or defers to another sign as the interpreted 
sign or the interpretant sign. In this case, cultures invest their signs with 
the capacity for interrogative intonation and responsive comprehension 
(Bakhtin). Insofar as they are signs such signs interrogate other 
interpretants, in turn signs, in turn a question in a dialogue. This 
approach offers the only possibility of escape from relativism as much 
as from dogmatism, both being characterized by failure to recognize the 
other that is overpowered and excluded. 
  
Today’s sign universe is characterized by global 
communication, which tends to homogenize, homologate, level and 
cancel differences. Such a process inevitably leads to a sense of 
frustration for identities and differences, which consequently become 
even more obstinate in the will to assert themselves and prevail over 
other identities and other differences, in the will to assert their 
separation with respect to other identities and other differences, to 
assert their own identity-difference that instead tends to be denied by 
the social system. And reciprocal indifference among differences is 
quickly transformed into hostility and conflict towards that which is 
different, alien, the stranger. 
  
In what signs may we trace differences given that signs have 
now entered the circuits of global communication and circulate on the 
world market (which is connected to global communication) and whose 
vocation it is to cancel differences?  
  
Paradoxically, differences can only be traced in the past: signs 
of difference are signs received from the past; the present cancels them. 
That which may unite and differentiate and, therefore, identify is a 
common past: difference on the basis of religion, language, territorial 
distribution, origin, genealogy, roots, blood, skin colour, etc. Identity 
attempts to assert itself in what may constitute difference, whether in 
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the name of history or some ‘natural’ characteristic: witnesses to a 
cultural past, to tradition, habit, monuments, language and dialect, 
religion, ethnic group. Most significantly churches, museums, ruins, the 
historical parts of a city are the only characterizing elements, elements 
of identification in urban space which is otherwise anonymous and 
indistinct with respect to other urban spaces in today’s world of global 
communication. Today, the signs of identity are fixed between 
indifference and mummified difference.  
  
On the basis of identities fixed in this way, it is possible to 
keep at a distanceto varying degrees of abjection (ranging from hatred 
to so-called tolerance) that which on the contrary has become 
permeable in terms of national territory, urban space, suburbs, 
neighbourhoods, work-place and everyday life. The link to identity is 
given by religious, ethnic, linguistic differences, cultural past, and so 
forth. 
  
But identity based on signs of a common past becomes 
stronger in terms of the will to defend itself, and spreads more 
extensively in terms of space the more it is contradicted by ideologies 
put into circulation by worldwide communication, in spite of and 
beyond differences and borders. Identity thus described is reinforced 
when it identifies with the Nation, the State, or confederations of 
Nations and States such as the European Union, or the United States of 
America. On the basis of a common cultural past, identity will exclude 
the migrant from its boundaries, the so-called ‘extra-communitarian’ 
obliged to ask developed countries for hospitality because of disasters 
provoked in the country of origin by development itself. 
  
Nevertheless, signs of the closed community, of community 
identity, signs of the ‘small experience,’ may be counteracted by signs 
of the ‘great experience’ (Bakhtin), which flourish in dynamic and 
dialogic processes of deferral. Thanks to such processes signs are part 
of the open community, and participate with that community in 
relations of ‘interconnection with the other’ (Levinas, 1974), relations 
of involvement and irrevocable responsibility for the other, relations of 
unindifferent difference (see also Ponzio, 2002). 
  
That which unites each and every one of us to every other is 
the otherness of each one of us that cannot be reduced to any form of 
identity, whether of the individual or of the collectivity, that cannot be 
reduced to difference connected to a community of any sort. This 
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condition of not belonging, of reciprocal strangeness unites us in the 
relation of inindifference towards each other. As much as identity and 
identity interests may be indifferent to the difference of single 
individuals, to the difference of all forms of identity to the point of 
overpowering and excluding them, difference based on closed identity 
with its identity interests cannot cancel the essential condition of 
reciprocal strangeness, of reciprocal otherness. 
  
Global communication renders signs of difference obsolete, it 
renders the aberrant use of signs to make difference ever more 
anachronistic and delusory. Today’s system of social reproduction is 
the latest social form in which signs are used to make difference. But 
this very same system is at once also making it impossible to use signs 
in this sense, that is, to make and mark difference.  
  
Paradoxically, social reproduction today whilst endangering 
life over the entire planet in the present-day situation of global 
communication, is at once and in spite of itself moving towards a social 
system that can offer the only possible chance of salvation for planetary 
semiosis, if it is not too late. We are now alluding to a social system 
where signs are open to otherness and flourish in deferral processes as 
is the nature of the semiosic universe in its (detotalized) totality, of life. 
Indeed, we have observed that the signs of anthroposemiosis, 
differently from the rest of the semiosic universe, are also endowed 
with a semiotic capacity that is proper to human beings, that is, a 
capacity for metasemiosis which implies the capacity for creativity, 
critique and responsibility. The new human community we are 
prognosticating is characterized by planetary interconnection without 
the community, a community that is not a community understood as a 
closed community; on the contrary, a community made of signs that are 
different, but without signs of difference that make difference, without 
signs of closed identities, without property, without territories, without 
ownership, without equality or inequality, without roots and origins, 
without boundaries and bonds, without belonging: a real community 
society, the open community, to evoke Charles Morris (1901-1979) 
(see Morris, 1948). As the doctrine of inter-genre and trans-genre 
communication, in our specific case, as the doctrine of inter-cultural 
and trans-ethnic communication, translation semioethics aims to 
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ABSTRACT: Translation as the Doctrine of Inter-genre and 
Trans-genre Communication: A Semioethic Perspective ─ The 
proposal of ‘translation semioethics’ with its focus on inter-genre and 
trans-genre communication, that is, communication among 
singularities, arises in the context of global semiotics developed in the 
direction of semioethics. Translation semioethics contributes to 
underlining  the need for the humanism of alterity by contrast with the 
humanism of identity. 
 
RÉSUMÉ : La traduction comme doctrine de la communication 
entre les genres et transgenre. Une perspective sémioéthique ─ La 
proposition d’une sémioéthique de la traduction centrée sur la 
communication entre les genres et transgenre, c’est-à-dire sur la 
communication entre des singularités, naît du contexte de la sémiotique 
globale, développée dans la direction de la sémioéthique. La 
sémioéthique de la traduction contribue à mettre en évidence le besoin 
d’humanisme de l’altérité en opposition avec l’humanisme de 
l’identité. 
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